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The Council Secretariat, under the leadership of Javier Solana, has become an 
indispensable actor in the context of the CFSP. This article gives a comprehensive 
overview of the development path of this EU institution since the beginning of European 
Political Cooperation. It argues that with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the parallel Cologne European Council (both 1999) it received at once a political and 
a military dimension. This has been the basis for a significant expansion during the last 
decade. From a wider perspective it shows that the Council Secretariat fills the political 
absence of the European Commission in the field of the CFSP. The Council Secretariat is 
basically strong in areas where the Commission is weak. These inter-institutional 
dynamics are important with a view to the Reform Treaty, which will see a partial merger 
of the CFSP services in both institutions. Lastly this article argues on a fundamental level 
that while these developments are significant, the rationale behind the Council Secretariat 




The Council Secretariat was until recently not a ‘very well-illuminated corner of the EU’s 
institutional architecture’.1 This has slightly changed. Several observers describe in detail 
how the institution has evolved in the first pillar due to its continuity, experience and 
‘institutional memory’.2 The Council Secretariat is no longer just a ‘conference centre’, a 
‘note-taker’ and a ‘legal adviser’; it is also a ‘political counsellor’ to the Presidency and an 
‘honest broker’ in the negotiations between Member States. The Council Secretariat 
                                                 
*  This article is based on interviews with officials from the Council Secretariat, the European 
Commission and the Permanent Representations in May-July 2006 and May-June 2007. 
**  Hylke Dijkstra is a PhD candidate and a junior lecturer at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
of Maastricht University. 
1  The Council Secretariat is formally called the General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union; T. Christiansen, ‘Out of the Shadows: The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers’ (2002) 8 
Journal of Legislative Studies, p. 81. In this article Christiansen outlines the three functions of the Secretariat 
discussed in this introduction. 
2  E.g. M. Westlake and D. Galloway (eds), The Council of the European Union (3rd edn, John 
Harper, London, 2004); F. Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers (2nd edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2006). 
  
operates nonetheless behind the scenes under the guidance of the Presidency. If its 
officials speak in the Council working groups, it is to provide legal advice or to discuss 
technical issues. These first pillar responsibilities constitute the ‘traditional’ business of 
the Council Secretariat and consume the majority of its resources.  
A second responsibility of the Council Secretariat is its role in Treaty reform. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty it provides during the course of an Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) the resources for the IGC Secretariat. This makes the Council 
Secretariat an influential player. Two close observers even go so far as to argue that the 
Council Secretariat was the key actor in the Nice IGC (2000) together with the Presidency, 
because of its expertise and the information rich environment.3 Apart from these anecdotal 
observations, a number of articles gives a more detailed and theoretical account of the role 
of the Council Secretariat in Treaty reform.4 While its position is arguably stronger during 
the Intergovernmental Conferences than in the first pillar, the Secretariat again remains in 
the background in order to guarantee its neutrality as an honest broker. 
The third, and final, function of the Council Secretariat concerns its role in the 
context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This responsibility has 
developed significantly under the leadership of Javier Solana (1999-present) and it differs 
fundamentally from the other two tasks. Whereas the Council Secretariat’s influence 
results from being ‘distinctly quiet’ in the first pillar and during the IGCs, in the CFSP it is 
speaking out loud.5 Not only does Solana at the political level issue his daily statements; 
officials from the foreign policy directorates also express their views openly in the various 
working groups. And yet despite this outspokenness and despite Solana being lauded in 
the media as the EU foreign policy chief, he and his institution have received limited 
attention in academia. Many publications do mention Solana, the Policy Unit or the EU 
Military Staff (EUMS), but few of them address the Council Secretariat specifically. The 
Secretariat therefore remains to this date somewhat ‘in the shadows’. 
This article tries to give a comprehensive account of the development and the 
changing role of the Council Secretariat since the beginning of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). It fits in with a growing body of literature on the administrative 
governance of the CFSP.6 In line with these publications, this article argues that these 
institutional structures ‘matter’ for the outcomes of the CFSP and that these structures are 
thus worth studying. The Council Secretariat matters in European foreign policy and it 
matters more and more. And yet this article also argues that the Council Secretariat does 
not have the potential to become the equivalent of the European Commission in, for 
                                                 
3  M. Gray & A. Stubb, ‘Keynote article: The Treaty of Nice – Negotiating a Poisoned Chalice?’ 
(2001) 39 Annual Review of the JCMS, pp. 5-23. 
4  D. Beach, ‘The unseen hand in treaty reform negotiations: the role and influence of the Council 
Secretariat’ (2004), 11 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 408-439; T. Christiansen, ‘The role of 
supranational actors in EU treaty reform’ (2002) 9 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 33-53. 
5  Christiansen (2002) op. cit., see note 1. 
6  S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Administrative governance in the CFSP: development and 
practice’ (2006) 11 EFA Rev, pp. 163-182; S. Duke, ‘The Linchpin Cops: Assessing the workings and 
institutional relations of the Political and Security Committee’ (2005) EIPA Working Paper; A.E. Juncos 
and C. Reynolds, ‘The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadows’ (2007) 12 EFA Rev, 
pp. 127-147; A.E. Juncos and K. Pomorska, ‘Playing the Brussels game: Strategic socialisation in the CFSP 
Council Working Groups’ (2006) European Integration online Papers; S. Duke, ‘The Commission and the 
CFSP’ (2006) EIPA Working Paper; D. Spence, ‘The European Commission and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’ in D. Spence with G. Edwards (eds), The European Commission (John Harper, London, 
2006). 
  
example, the internal market, because the raison d’être for such an autonomous 
supranational bureaucracy is absent in the CFSP. 
The CFSP services in the Council Secretariat were created over time to limit the 
administrative burden of the rotating Presidency and the Member States. It was a sensible 
way of reducing the transaction costs of cooperation and thus yielding positive efficiency 
payoffs for the Member States. Because the Member States, and in particular France, were 
afraid of too much European Commission involvement in the area of ‘high politics’, they 
decided to continue to keep the latter at arms length by delegating various tasks to the 
Council Secretariat. The Secretariat is thus performing the tasks the Commission is not 
allowed to do. It fills a specific niche: nature abhors a vacuum.7 
This article will first give a short historical overview of the Council Secretariat and 
its predecessor, the EPC Secretariat, until the end of the 1990s. In parallel it will 
subsequently discuss the Council Secretariat’s ‘political dimension’, which was as a result 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, and its ‘military dimension’ resulting from the Cologne 
European Council (both 1999). It will conclude by discussing the possible bureaucratic 
merger that lies ahead as a result of the Reform Treaty. 
 
II The historical perspective (1970-1999) 
 
The CFSP is perhaps mostly identified with the word ‘intergovernmental’ and still reflects 
much of the legacy of President De Gaulle and his failed Fouchet Plans (1959-1963). The 
most prominent feature of these plans was to keep the European Commission in all foreign 
policy discussions at arms length. A Paris-based secretariat (‘Political Commission’) 
would support the Member States in counterbalancing the United States as the sole 
Western superpower. While this blueprint for an ‘intergovernmental Europe’ never 
entered into force due to resistance of the integrationist and Atlanticist Member States, it 
was clear that the Commission would not become an equitable player in foreign policy 
coordination any time soon.  
In the Luxembourg Report (1970), which formally established European Political 
Cooperation, the European Commission was only to ‘be consulted if the activities of the 
European Communities [were] affected by the work of the Ministers’.8 While this gave it 
some influence when economic issues were discussed, it was only with the London Report 
(1981) that the Commission became ‘fully associated’ with the conduct of EPC. It meant 
access to all the meetings and documents, but the formal powers which the Commission 
enjoyed in the first pillar remained out of the question. To this date, despite having 
significantly increased its influence in the CFSP, the Commission has never been able to 
play the role it is used to in the Communities. 
It is necessary to point out that within foreign policy coordination there was also 
no need for a strong Commission. As rational choice institutionalists argue the 
Commission’s main purpose in the first pillar is to ensure ‘credible commitments’ among 
Member States – that is compliance with the Treaties and secondary legislation – through 
                                                 
7  Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006) note that the Presidency and the Council Secretariat ‘fill the 
vacuum (…) of the [Commission] in the CFSP’, op. cit., see note 6, p. 180. This article substantiates this 
claim. 
8  Luxembourg Report 1970, article V. 
  
for example independently monitoring the agreements.9 Yet within EPC there was no 
formal substantive treaty to abide by. It consisted of constantly reformulating policy 
towards third countries and regions and was in this respect clearly a ‘coordination’ rather 
than ‘collaboration’ game. In such a game there is no incentive for Member States to 
defect from the coordinated agreement once it has been reached by consensus, because the 
payoffs of this collective action are always higher than of individual action through the 
‘politics of scale’ which are achieved.10  
Even if Member States defected, it was often no longer possible to remedy the 
damage by an infringement procedure or court action. It would have been, for example, 
impossible to undo the German unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, 
because it was a one shot-event at one particular moment. Supranational bureaucracy 
could not play a role here.11 The rationale for the establishment of supranational 
bureaucracy in foreign policy must therefore instead be sought in the reduction of the 
transaction costs of cooperation (efficiency) rather than in ‘credible commitments’. 
 Since EPC was formally created outside the Communities’ framework, it was 
initially the idea of the Member States to fill the Commission’s absence with an 
independent secretariat. This secretariat – comparable to, yet smaller than the 
Communities’ Council and Parliament Secretariats – could take care of some of the 
supporting functions such as arranging rooms and translators. The choice of the location 
proved, however, insurmountable. Whereas the integrationist Member States preferred 
Brussels, because of possible synergies with the Communities’ institutions, France 
championed Paris, especially to avoid spillover caused by the ‘Europeanization’ process. 
Because of this disagreement the Member States decided in the Luxembourg Report 
instead to delegate the supporting tasks to the host state (the Presidency). For the first 
seventeen years of its existence, the EPC activities thus took place in the country holding 
the Presidency without the help of a secretariat and it became a ‘biannual travelling circus 
with as only continuity an archive suitcase being transported from capital to capital’.12 
 Over the years some improvements were made, such as the Troika Secretariat of 
the London Report (1981), in which the incoming and outgoing Presidencies seconded one 
national diplomat to the foreign ministry of the Presidency-in-office to mitigate the EPC’s 
increasingly heavy administrative burden. It was furthermore a way to improve the 
continuity between the Presidencies, something which was badly needed after the EPC 
breakdown during the Russian invasion in Afghanistan over the Christmas holidays 
(1979). Foreign ministers furthermore decided to synchronize their Communities’ and 
EPC agendas after the infamous day that they discussed EPC matters in Copenhagen in 
the morning before flying to Brussels to debate Communities’ affairs in the afternoon. Yet 
                                                 
9  E.g. M.A. Pollack, ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community’ (1997) 
51 International Organization, pp. 99-135; A. Moravcsik, Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State 
Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998). 
10  See for a more elaborate explanation: W. Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s Common Foreign Policy Will 
Remain Intergovernmental: A Rationalist Institutionalist Choice Analysis of European Crisis Management 
Policy’ (2003) 10 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 576-595; ‘Politics of Scale’ was introduced by R. 
Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale (Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, 1989) 
11  Wagner (2003), op.cit., see note 10. 
12  S. Vanhoonacker and H. Dijkstra, ‘EU-Raadsecretariaat en Europees buitenlands beleid: Méér dan 
een griffier’ (2006) 60 Internationale Spectator, p. 636. 
  
EPC remained throughout the early years, as Nuttall famously recalls, a ‘club run by 
diplomats for diplomats’.13 
 The situation changed after the Single European Act (SEA), which formally 
brought the European Communities (EC) and EPC together in one legal document. It was 
however only the piece of paper that could genuinely be described as single. Article 3 of 
the chapeau language clearly separated the EC and EPC in different titles. These titles can 
be seen as the predecessors of the Maastricht pillars. Between these titles there was little 
interaction and the Communities’ institutions remained excluded from much of the foreign 
policy decision-making. The SEA did create a small-scale and independent EPC 
Secretariat in Brussels, which was rather revolutionary given the earlier location disputes. 
It replaced the Troika Secretariat and it meant that EPC finally had a permanent base. 
  The EPC Secretariat was a watered-down version of a proposal by President 
Mitterrand to establish a high-level independent Secretary General in charge of foreign 
policy coordination. The Secretariat’s formal role was to ‘assist the Presidency’ and for 
this purpose it had five national seconded diplomats and a head of secretariat at its 
disposal.14 These diplomats received national salaries and according to their legal status 
they were formally based at the permanent representations. The offices of the EPC 
Secretariat were located on the twelfth floor of the Charlemagne building, which housed at 
the time the EC Council Secretariat; yet it was not formally part of it: a combination lock 
at the entrance of the EPC Secretariat made clear that even under the Single European Act, 
foreign policy and Communities’ affairs remained two worlds apart.15 
Despite its limited formal role, the influence of the EPC Secretariat developed 
steadily.16 This happened in a similar fashion as the EC’s Council Secretariat was gaining 
influence over time – due to its experience, continuity and ‘institutional memory’. In 
addition, the Head of the Secretariat sometimes represented the Presidency to the outside 
world as regards EPC matters, as the revolving Presidency still meant that EPC had 
otherwise no Brussels base.17 The first SEA Presidency was furthermore Belgium. Due to 
its integrationist preferences, it gave the Secretariat quite some autonomy.18 This set an 
important precedent for future presidencies. And yet the EPC Secretariat’s main role 
concerned facilitating the coordination process between the Member States. The 
Presidency remained firmly in charge of the conceptual work. 
While EPC was re-branded in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
during the Maastricht Treaty (1993) to take on the new challenges of the post-Cold War 
era, the institutional structure was not significantly altered. The Commission gained the 
shared right of initiative, but its hopes for a full rapprochement between the Communities 
and EPC activities were shattered by the pillar structure. The EPC Secretariat was 
integrated in the EC Council Secretariat’s Directorate-General for External Relations (DG 
E) and became known as the CFSP unit. It was furthermore strengthened with one 
                                                 
13  S. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), p. 272. 
14  Art. 10(g) SEA. 
15  Nuttall (2000) op. cit., see note 13 
16  E. Regelsberger, ‘The Setup and Functioning of EPC/CFSP’ in E. Regelsberger, P. De Schoutheete 
de Tervarent and W. Wessels (eds), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond 
(Lynne Rienner, London, 1997). 
17  Nuttall (2000) op. cit., see note 13 
18  P.S. Da Costa Pereira, ‘The Use of a Secretariat’ in A. Pijpers et al. (eds), European Political 
Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? (M. Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1998). 
While Belgium had preferred that these new services were placed in the Commission rather than in an 
independent secretariat, it felt that it was best to make most out of the Secretariat. 
  
seconded national official per Member States, twelve officials from the Council 
Secretariat, one Commission official and a head of unit (26 in total). In addition to the 
CFSP unit, DG E included the directorates dealing with the external relations of the 
Communities (trade and development).  
The dichotomy of the SEA continued to exist within this Directorate General. The 
split between the external economic relations’ directorates and the CFSP unit was not only 
a formal division; there was also a difference in their daily tasks. In the field of external 
economic relations the Commission was clearly the leading supranational institution. This 
meant that the directorates of the Council Secretariat were mainly concerned with the 
‘traditional’ tasks of the Secretariat.  The situation was different in the second pillar, 
where the Commission had a more limited role. This vacuum gave the CFSP unit ample 
room to assist the Presidency on substantive and conceptual issues, such as drafting 
agendas and providing policy papers. Over the years these responsibilities increased. 
Despite the split, there was also considerable overlap between the CFSP unit and the 
external relations directorates. Both structures were mainly regionally orientated. While 
this had to do with the parallel EC and CFSP working groups, it did not improve 
consistency. 
The CFSP unit stayed roughly the same during the larger part of the 1990s; and 
should be seen as a continuation of the EPC Secretariat. The changes of the Amsterdam 
Treaty would however prove profound. Shortly after the national leaders had left 
Maastricht, Germany unilaterally recognized Slovakian and Croatian independence 
exposing European solidarity and the newly created CFSP. A few months later the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia led to an open war in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina. The CFSP 
machinery was not designed to deal with the EU’s prime foreign policy concern in the 
1990s – the Balkan conflict in its own backyard. One could expect from the CFSP unit to 
facilitate the coordination process among Member States, but not to guarantee the 
convergence of their preferences. Questions about the visibility, continuity and 
effectiveness of the CFSP were to be addressed at the Amsterdam summit, which brought 
the CFSP to a higher level. 
 
III The political dimension 
 
In a reaction to Europe’s failures over Bosnia, France picked up Mitterrand’s old idea of 
having a ‘Secretary General’ for foreign policy. This would give the CFSP greater 
visibility and continuity. The French initially had their former President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing in mind.19 Since this idea met with resistance from almost all the other Member 
States the initial proposals were significantly watered down in the course of the 
negotiations. At the end of the day, the ‘High Representative for the CFSP’ did not 
become an independent agent, but is based in the Council Secretariat. He fulfils at the 
same time the duties of the Secretary General of the Council (SG/HR) and assists rather 
than supersedes the Presidency.20 What remained unclear at the summit was whether the 
SG/HR would be a politician or a bureaucrat. This decision was delayed until 1999.  
 The outside world did not wait for the Union to have its High Representative. 
Before the Treaty entered into force the EU was faced with the Kosovo crisis (1998/9). Its 
response was again inadequate. After various rounds of failed negotiations US leadership 
                                                 
19  A. Moravcsik and K. Nicolaides, ‘Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, 
Institutions’ (1999) 37 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 59-85. 
20  Art. 18(3) and 26 TEU. 
  
put an end to the conflict via NATO air strikes (24 March-11 June 1999). In the midst of 
this campaign the EU Member States gathered to appoint the SG/HR (Cologne European 
Council 3-4 June). The Amsterdam Treaty had, after all, entered into force a month earlier. 
Given this international context, there was no way but to appoint a high-level political 
figure. Javier Solana – the successful NATO Secretary General – was recruited for the job 
and he entered office in October. 
 It is safe to state that Solana developed his position significantly. In the beginning 
the various Presidencies kept him at a short rein, especially when photo-opportunities 
arose. The United Kingdom furthermore prevented him from becoming the permanent 
chairman of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) – a French proposal.21 Over time 
he gained however respect due to his effectiveness. During his reappointment in 2004, he 
was designated by the European Council as the future EU foreign minister, a position 
foreseen at the time in the Constitution. This de facto status, together with the momentum 
of the various military and civilian missions, significantly strengthened his position. The 
German Presidency (first half 2007) decided that he could chair various ministerial 
troikas, in which case they sent an undersecretary to clearly show Solana was in charge.22 
In the Reform Treaty the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy’ formally chairs the General Affairs Council. 
 At the administrative level, the choice for a top-level politician inevitably meant a 
strengthening of the private office (Solana’s cabinet). Currently Solana can benefit from 
the support of a head of cabinet, a deputy head of cabinet and four political counsellors. 
The Deputy Secretary General, Pierre de Boissieu, has his own head of cabinet, albeit in 
the same private office.23 These cabinet members are either seconded national officials or 
permanent Council Secretariat staff members and cover the major nationalities (Spain, 
France, Germany, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden). Only one is a direct 
political appointee. The private office has, however, not yet developed into a real cabinet. 
Rather than making overall strategic decisions and giving political guidelines, the officials 
are busy with coordinating Solana’s agenda. Each of the four counsellors, in this respect, 
has its regional and thematic dossiers.24 
 The private office of the SG/HR has direct oversight over a number of services, 
some of which one could refer to as constituting the ‘extended cabinet’. These include the 
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (better known as Policy Unit) and the EU 
Personal and Special Representatives. The Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the EU 
Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) also 
directly report to the SG/HR (see ‘military dimension’ below).   
 During the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty, the creation of the Policy Unit 
was uncontroversial.25 In light of the Bosnian War a strengthening of the CFSP services 
                                                 
21  The PSC (2000-present) replaced the monthly meeting of the Political Directors in the Political 
Committee. As a permanent Brussels-based body it meets twice a week and deals with most of the issues on 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council’s agenda. Duke (2005) op. cit.; Juncos and Reynolds 
(2007) op. cit., see note 6. 
22  Interview with Council Secretariat official. 
23  Art. 207 TEC stipulates that the ‘Deputy Secretary-General [is] responsible for the [day-to-day] 
running of the General Secretariat’. This was a compromise to strengthen the foreign policy profile of the 
SG/HR.  
24  Interviews with Council Secretariat officials. 
25  S. Duke, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Significant but Modest Changes’ in F. 
Laursen (ed.), 
  
seemed necessary and the Policy Unit would support the newly created High 
Representative in its strategic work by, for example, monitoring and analyzing relevant 
developments, providing relevant strategic assessments, and drafting ‘argued policy 
options papers’.26 In other words, the officials in the unit are ‘Solana’s eyes and ears’.27 
The Policy Unit is mainly organized along regional taskforces and consists of one 
seconded national official per Member State, a Commission representative, and staff 
members from the WEU and the Council Secretariat (in total 31).28  
 The Policy Unit has, however, never lived up to its high expectations. The quality 
of some of the seconded national officials has proved rather disappointing. National 
capitals and the Commission have also been reluctant in sharing their diplomatic 
memoranda with their own members in the Policy Unit.29 This has limited its potential. 
The injection of seconded national officials at the highest level of European foreign policy 
also created friction with DG E. The task forces of the Policy Unit were in clear 
competition with DG E’s regional directorates. While the Policy Unit stressed it was 
working for Solana, DG E never accepted working solely for the Presidency. The division 
of labour was thus not very successful, and as a result of the fifth enlargement round, it 
was decided to integrate parts of the Policy Unit in the DG E’s regional directorates.30 The 
Policy Unit has, however, proved ‘sticky’ as an organization; it is in the Treaties, so it 
cannot be abandoned. 
 The EU Special Representatives were also created in the Amsterdam Treaty as a 
codification of the EU Special Envoys.31 Their task is to ‘promote EU policies and 
interests in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate 
peace, stability and the rule of law’.32 While they are appointed by the Council via a Joint 
Action, they report to Solana and support his work; they are his ‘face’ and his ‘voice’ on 
the ground.33 Financing the EUSRs is interesting in that the EUSR him/herself and the 
logistics are paid for by the CFSP budget, while his/her staff contains of seconded national 
officials paid by the Member States. Several Member States have used this opportunity to 
further their interests.34 
In some cases the EUSR is part of a ‘double-hatting’ arrangement, which 
strengthens his/her position. Erwan Fouéré, the EUSR in Macedonia, is for example also 
the Commission’s head of delegation. Miroslav Lajčák, the EUSR in Bosnia-and-
Herzegovina, also carries out the tasks of the UN’s Office of the High Representative. A 
similar arrangement is foreseen for the future EUSR in Kosovo. While the idea behind 
appointing EUSRs was to create more EU consistency within conflict regions, they are 
often seen as an extra layer of bureaucracy, they have regular turf battles with the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining and Outcome 
(Odense University Press, Odense, 2002). 
26  The full task description can be found in article 2 of the ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a 
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit’, attached to the Amsterdam treaty.   
27  F. Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy (Routledge, London, 2007), p. 49. 
28  Council of Ministers, Extract from the Interinstitutional Directory – January 2007 (Office of 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2007). 
29  Interviews with Council Secretariat officials. 
30  The fifth enlargement round saw an expansion of the Policy Unit with the number of seconded 
national diplomats increasing from fifteen to twenty-seven. 
31  Art. 18 TEU; G. Grevi, ‘Making EU Foreign Policy: The Role of the EU Special Representatives’ 
(2007) 5 CFSP Forum, pp. 1-5. 
32  Council of Ministers, EU Special Representatives Factsheet (2007). 
33  Ibid. 
34  Interviews with Council Secretariat and European Commission officials. 
  
Commission delegations and they have proven unnecessary when it comes to civilian 
ESDP missions.35 EUSRs should not be mistaken with Solana’s Personal Representatives, 
yet another part of his ‘extended cabinet’. The Personal Representatives deal with the 
thematic issues such as non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, human rights, and 
parliamentary affairs. 
The Amsterdam Treaty did not only restructure and strengthen the political level of 
the Council Secretariat; it also had a major impact on the bureaucracy of DG E. The two 
distinct branches of foreign policy (trade and development & CFSP) in DG E were finally 
merged and the various directorates were significantly strengthened.36 Seconded national 
officials were furthermore replaced by permanent officials over time. The DG E was again 
expanded as a result of the inclusion of staff from the Policy Unit (2004) and through the 
creation of two ESDP directorates (2001). In total DG E currently consists of almost 200 
A-grade officials and has special New York and Geneva offices to facilitate the EU 
coordination process at the international organizations. 
The daily tasks of the various directorates range from the ‘traditional’ business of 
the Council Secretariat in the development and trade directorates to full executive tasks in 
the ESDP directorates. The yardstick, against which the DG E’s activities should be 
measured, negatively correlates with the European Commission’s competences. In case of 
a strong Commission (e.g. trade; enlargement; EU-Asia relations), the Council Secretariat 
is weak and merely carries out supporting tasks. In case of a weak Commission (e.g. 
ESDP; Middle-East; Afghanistan), the Council Secretariat takes the lead. It is worth 
mentioning that these tasks are accumulative. Even though the officials in the ESDP 
directorates carry out advanced executive functions, they still remain responsible for 
booking rooms, arranging translation and making the minutes. This is different from 
NATO, where in the International Staff the conceptual work is split from the ‘conference 
centre’ activities.37 
While DG E was developed significantly it is necessary to state that, with the 
exception of the ESDP directorates, the rationale behind the Council Secretariat has not 
dramatically changed since the EPC Secretariat of the SEA. It still helps to limit the 
transaction costs the Member States encounter from cooperation in the field of foreign 
policy. In this coordination game, the Council Secretariat officials improve the efficiency 
of decision-making through their expertise, their continuity and institutional memory. 
They generally do not contribute to ‘credible commitments’ and as a result the potential 
for possible autonomy is limited.38 
  
IV The military dimension 
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The Kosovo crisis not only played an important role in the appointment of Solana; it also 
created the momentum to establish the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
During the course of the 1990s France had become less wary of NATO having seen its 
merits in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.39 Meanwhile the new British leadership understood 
that the solution to all problems no longer came from across the Atlantic. The Kosovo 
crisis accelerated this rapprochement. The event painfully showed the Member States’ 
lack of capabilities and political will to intervene. Europe’s inability to deal with the crisis 
in its own backyard led to the bilateral Anglo-French St. Malo declaration (December 
1998), which called for ‘the capacity for autonomous action’.40 The St. Malo agreement 
was quickly endorsed by the other Member States in the Cologne European Council (June 
1999) in what became the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
 The political will to make the CFSP an operational rather than solely declaratory 
policy required a new institutional framework. At the Helsinki summit (December 1999) 
the Heads of State and Government took a first step when they directed the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council to set up an interim Political and Security 
Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff. The relevant Council Decisions 
entered into force on the 1 March 2000 and this arguably gave the Union a de facto fourth 
pillar.41 The Helsinki European Council also tasked the French Presidency (second half 
2000) to propose permanent structures. Its proposal, submitted to the Nice European 
Council (December 2000), was along similar lines as the interim structures. After formal 
approval by the Council a permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU 
Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) were created.42 
 Whereas the PSC and EUMC are intergovernmental bodies, the EUMS is based in 
the Council Secretariat. Although it operates under the guidance of the EUMC, it provides 
EU bodies ‘and, in particular, (…) the Secretary-General/High Representative’ with 
military expertise.43 Its main task is to perform ‘early warning, situation assessment and 
strategic planning for Petersberg tasks’ and to implement ESDP missions.44 For this 
purpose it has currently 200+ personnel consisting of seconded national military and 
civilian officials, who are all serving a three to four years term. They are divided over 
various directorates, of which the Executive Office (EXO) and Civil-Military cell (CivMil 
cell) deserve special attention. 
 The EXO coordinates the work of the EUMS and ensures appropriate liaisons with 
the NATO, UN, and African Union, including through the special EU cell in NATO and 
the EU military adviser based in New York. The CivMil cell, which was initiated at the 
Tervuren ‘chocolate’ summit, tries to promote civil-military cooperation within the 
Council Secretariat and the European Union, and is the base of the newly created EU 
Operations Centre (see below).45 While civil-military cooperation is supposed to be 
Europe’s unique selling point, the CivMil cell’s potential has been significantly hampered 
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by a lack of political will behind its ambitious mandate, and by internal turf battles within 
the Council Secretariat.46 
 In addition to the establishment of the new military structures, the ESDP also led to 
significant developments in DG E. Two new directorates were established in 2001, 
dealing with Defence Issues (Directorate 8) and with Civilian Crisis Management 
(Directorate 9). Their task is – in line with ‘Western democratic tradition’ – to keep 
‘political/civilian oversight’ over the military. From the beginning, however, the 
responsibilities of both directorates differed. While the Directorate for Defence Issues 
could rely on the EUMS and on an Operation Headquarters (OHQ) for the implementation 
of operations, the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management did not have such civilian 
equivalents and had to do everything by itself. As one observer put it, ‘Directorate 9 [was] 
at once the Directorate 8, the EUMS and the OHQ of civilian crisis management’.47 This 
had implications for the line of command and the structure of ESDP missions. Member 
States realized that this was not an optimal scenario and in the course of 2007 the 
Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management was significantly restructured. 
 The permanent staff members in both Directorates were recruited through a 
specialized competition (concours); this to the frustration of WEU staff, who were under 
the impression that they would automatically be integrated into the Council Secretariat’s 
structures.48 In addition to the permanent staff, large numbers of seconded national 
officials were contracted. In total these new directorates consisted of 43 officials at the 
start, but they have grown significantly. The Directorates for Defence Issues and Civilian 
Crisis Management consisted of 21 and 40 staff members in 2007.49 
 As mentioned above, in the course of 2007 the Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability (CPCC) was created to professionalize civilian crisis management. During the 
ESDP negotiations in 1998-2000 the focus was predominantly on military capabilities. 
The possibilities for civilian ESDP operations were only raised on Nordic insistence and 
developed during the Swedish and Danish presidencies (2001; 2002). Because the civilian 
branch of ESDP was a fairly late arrival, and because of French resistance, appropriate 
institutional structures and terms of reference were not developed. With a view to the 
civilian ESDP operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo (from 2007 onwards), the Member 
States decided to restructure civilian crisis management by making it more rigorous 
through the establishment of the CPCC – the civilian equivalent of the EUMS. Many 
functions and resources of the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management were 
transferred to the CPCC, leaving it only with oversight tasks comparable to the Directorate 
for Defence Issues.50 
  
1. The Council Secretariat in the ESDP policy cycle 
 
Through the variety of these bodies the Council Secretariat has become an important 
player in ESDP. To get a better understanding of its influence, it is necessary to shortly 
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discuss its role in the three phases of the ESDP policy cycle. During the agenda-setting 
phase, Solana and the Council Secretariat have on several occasions openly promoted 
ESDP operations, often in tandem with a number of Member States. Examples of such 
entrepreneurship are the Rafah Border Crossing Mission and the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission. In the former Solana stressed that if the EU wanted to be an equitable player in 
the Quartet, it had to contribute in order to be part of the solution. Solana furthermore 
argued in the Aceh operation that it was an excellent example of the EU as a ‘force for 
good’ and that would invigorate Europe’s image as a global actor. Given the reluctance of 
many Member States towards the operation in Asia in the first place, the Council 
Secretariat can take some of the credit for its eventual success.51 
 The ESDP decision-making phase consists of the adoption of a number of 
documents, such as the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and the Joint Action, by the 
PSC and the Council. These ‘decision-making documents’ are drafted by respectively the 
Directorate for Defence Issues and the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management. 
Because these directorates have only limited expertise they often consult with the EUMS, 
which is located in the same Cortenbergh building. It is worth mentioning that these 
documents are often drafted in parallel with the ‘implementation documents’ under de 
responsibility of the EUMS (see below). The time frame is short and the political decision-
makers want to know which resources they have to contribute (i.e. force composition) 
before making the political decision.52 
 Because these documents require significant military expertise and because the EU 
is a complex system, it is often difficult for the diplomats in the CIVCOM and the military 
attachés in the working groups to keep track of all developments. Especially the smaller 
Member States have to pick their battles and have to make sure that the diplomats in 
Brussels are constantly informed by the relevant ministries in the capitals. Sometimes the 
Member States are successful – for example in case of the Afghanistan mission many 
Member States watched the developments carefully – sometimes not.53 This informational 
asymmetry is an important source of influence for the Council Secretariat. 
 When it comes to the implementation phase there is a difference between the 
military and civilian missions. In the former, the EUMS drafts the Strategic Military 
Options and helps the Operations Commander developing the Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) and the Operational Plan (OPLAN). The Joint Action will stipulate whether 
the mission is carried out by the NATO under the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement, by one of the 
five national Operational Headquarters (France, UK, Germany, Italy, Greece), or by the 
newly created small scale EU Operations Centre in Brussels. Although the last option has 
not yet been used, it has all different kinds of advantages over the other two options.54 
When the Operations Centre will be used, the EUMS is effectively in charge of the whole 
implementation process – though monitored by the Directorate for Defence Issues and the 
PSC – which will make it an influential player. 
 Civilian crisis management is different, because the European Commission is 
involved in financing the mission and because until recently there was no civilian 
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equivalent of the EUMS and the Operational Headquarters. Because the financing of 
military operations is a sensitive issue, the Member States decided to develop the 
ATHENA mechanism outside the Commission’s range, in which an administrator of the 
Council Secretariat is in charge of the budget. In civilian crisis management the 
Commission, however, manages the various budgets. This implies that in the 
implementation phase, the officials from the Council Secretariat and the Commission are 
in constant contact to discuss the development of the mission. This has given the 
Commission an important say and has negatively impacted on the Council Secretariat’s 
influence.55 
 All the implementation documents, which were drafted by the EUMS in case of 
military operations, were furthermore written by the Directorate for Civilian Crisis 
Management in the civilian missions. Until 2007 this Directorate also took care of all the 
procurement, logistics, and contracts with host countries, third countries and actors on the 
ground. Unintentionally the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management thus transformed 
partially into an informal Operations Centre. Since 2007 these tasks have been taken over 
by the CPCC.  
 The officials of the Council Secretariat thus overall play an important and 
influential role when it comes to ESDP missions. Their role also differs from the CFSP 
proper. In addition to improving the coordination game between the Member States, the 
Council Secretariat in the context of ESDP also plays a major role in the implementation 
process. While the agent is continuously monitored by the principals in the PSC and the 
underlying working groups, the EUMS and the CPCC can more and more be characterized 
as expert bureaucracies, which have gained their autonomy through expertise. That having 
been said, it is questionable in how far the interests of the Secretariat actually deviate from 
the Member States. A large majority of the officials are still seconded by the Member 
States and the consensus requirement makes any kind of entrepreneurship difficult. 
 
V Conclusion: towards integration 
 
This article has shown that the Council Secretariat received at once a political and military 
dimension at the Cologne European Council (1999). Christiansen and Vanhoonacker are 
therefore right to identify this summit as a ‘critical juncture’ in the Secretariat’s 
development path.56 Its foreign policy competences changed significantly over time due to 
the agreements reached at this summit and the number of officials in the foreign policy 
services sky-rocketed. As the two previous parallel sections have shown, the Council 
Secretariat is now indispensable for the conduct of both CFSP and ESDP. 
In trying to explain the events at the Cologne European Council, it directly 
becomes obvious that the environment was right. The positions of France and the United 
Kingdom on European defence were as close as they get during the Kosovo crisis. The 
United States furthermore, despite Albright’s ‘three Ds’, desperately wanted Europe to get 
its act together and to contribute to the new post-Cold War era. There was popular support 
for more integration and the current ‘CFSP system’ clearly did not work. One could thus 
maybe argue that the Member States slightly overreacted in the spur of the moment and 
that the Council Secretariat benefited. 
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When taking a broader historical perspective, it is also fair to say that the Council 
Secretariat has benefited from the Member States’ sovereignty concerns towards the 
European Commission. Time and again Commission proposals for a rapprochement 
between the Communities’ and foreign policy activities – implying a larger role for the 
Commission itself – were ignored. Of course the Commission’s role has incrementally 
increased and the former Commissioner Patten is right that the ‘back office’, as he calls it, 
‘often provide[s] most of the content’ of European foreign policy.57 Yet if one looks at the 
balance between the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative 
since 1999, one will quickly conclude that Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner lost out. 
The political vacuum created by the increased expectations of CFSP during the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties has been filled, in absence of the European 
Commission, by the Council Secretariat. If it was not for this vacuum, the Council 
Secretariat’s role would be more limited reflecting its formal powers. As pointed out 
earlier, the Council Secretariat is strong when the Commission is weak. The examples of 
this division of labour are numerous and the results are also predictable: the last decade 
has seen series of turf battles and consistency problems between the two. While this article 
is too short to elaborate on these inter-institutional relations, it is worth pointing to the 
future. 
One of the most prominent features of the Reform Treaty is the creation of a new 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will have a 
seat in the European Commission. In order to deal with the compartmentalization of the 
CFSP it is most likely that this will imply a partial merger between the CFSP services of 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat as part of a larger reform package concerning 
the European External Action Service. Looking at how Member States have kept the 
Commission at arms length for more than 35 years in foreign policy coordination, it 
seems, however, unlikely that all the Council Secretariat’s foreign policy services will be 
transferred to the Commission and that full integration will be reached. 
Despite the fact that the supranational services dealing with CFSP will be 
significantly strengthened under the Reform Treaty, this article has also shown the 
potential for autonomy remains limited. The EPC and Council Secretariat originated as a 
means to mitigate the transaction cost of cooperation for the Member States. Over time the 
coordination game has become ever more efficient. This was necessary given the various 
expectations of European foreign policy nowadays. The Council game in CFSP proper has 
changed, however, little compared to the early days despite the various 
institutionalizations. Consensus remains the rule and the formal powers of supranational 
institutions are in no way comparable to the ‘Community-method’ of the first pillar. There 
are no ‘credible commitments’ to guarantee. Because the Council Secretariat has 
developed as a facilitator in the CFSP rather than a monitor or a ‘guardian of the Treaties’, 
this will continue to have an impact on its influence even under the Reform Treaty with 
the ‘almost foreign minister’. 
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